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Frederick Schauerz 
In an age in which special prosecutors proliferate and in 
which journalists stumble over each other in their competition to 
see who can bring down the largest number of politicians, it 
would be plausible to ask whether the impeachment and removal 
powers set out in Article I of the Constitution retain any contem-
porary relevance. President Clinton, many of us suspect, worries 
most about what might be reported in the New York Times and 
the Washington Post, and then about what Special Prosecutor 
Kenneth Starr might do, and then about public criticism or con-
demnation from prominent political figures, with the possibility 
of impeachment in the House of Representatives and a trial and 
conviction in the Senate being far down the list, perhaps little 
more than an afterthought. In the language of those inside the 
Beltway, it is doubtful that impeachment is even on the Presi-
dent's radar screen. 
Yet despite its seeming decrease in relevance in post-(Rich-
ard) Nixon politics, impeachment is anything but a dead letter. 
Federal judges named Aguilar, Claiborne, Collins, Hastings, and 
(Walter) Nixon have all recently been through or threatened with 
impeachment proceedings, and as impeachment declines as the 
political weapon it was in the early days of the republic, it has 
appeared to emerge anew in its less political role as one of the 
most visible means of disciplining members of the federal 
judiciary. 
Against this background, and against the background of in-
creasing concern over whether members of the House and Sen-
ate have the inclination to devote the time and energy that the 
process seems to demand, Michael Gerhardt has written an im-
portant and definitive book setting forth the constitutional and 
procedural issues surrounding the impeachment process. Unlike 
earlier works on the topic, most notably Raoul Berger's Im-
peachment: The Constitutional Problems,3 Gerhardt's impressive 
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work is not largely devoted to an historical analysis, nor to recov-
ering the intentions of those who drafted and ratified the im-
peachment provisions in the Constitution. Chapters 1 and 2 do a 
competent job with the history, and the impeachment proceed-
ings of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are described 
at various points throughout the book, but the heart of the book 
is an analysis of the constitutional dimensions and procedural is-
sues surrounding the impeachment proceedings that have taken 
place subsequent to the impeachment processes directed against 
Richard Nixon. Much of Gerhardt's analysis, therefore, ema-
nates out of the proceedings culminating in the Supreme Court's 
decision in Walter Nixon v. United States,4 and focuses on the vi-
tal set of issues relating to the procedures that Congress does and 
ought to use in conducting impeachment proceedings, the consti-
tutional questions surrounding these procedures and the various 
ways in which Congress has sought to truncate them and thus to 
make them more manageable, and the extent to which any of 
these procedural (or substantive) issues are or should be review-
able by the federal judiciary. 
One of the book's chief virtues is that Gerhardt is actually 
interested in procedure, thus setting himself apart from the bulk 
of American constitutionalists and giving him the expertise and 
inclination to treat as more than just a passing matter questions 
of the burden of proof, (pp. 40-42, 112-13, 141-43) admissibility 
of evidence, (pp. 40-42, 115-16) pretrial discovery, (pp. 45-46) 
scheduling of proceedings, (p. 45) issue preclusion, res judicata, 
and collateral estoppel, (pp. 42-43; 151-52; cf. pp. 155-56) and, 
most importantly, the use of trial committees (or experts) in 
place of the full membership. (pp. 116-17, 153-56) Moreover, 
Gerhardt wisely and insightfully discusses the important second-
order procedural issue of who has the authority to set the proce-
dures. (pp. 169-72) Someone reading this book will get the 
sense, and an entirely correct sense at that, that on issues of im-
peachment, as with much of the rest of law, more of substance 
turns on questions of procedure than is often supposed. And if 
someone wishes to understand the procedures the House and 
Senate now employ in cases of impeachment, the practical and 
theoretical problems with those procedures, and the arguments 
for and against various proposals for reform, this book is now, 
and will likely remain for some time, the definitive work. 
Much the same can be said about Gerhardt's even more ex-
tensive treatment of the issues relating to the general question of 
4. 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993). 
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judicial review of impeachment procedures and outcomes. One 
such issue is the one that was the centerpiece of Walter Nixon v. 
United States, the question whether congressional procedural de-
terminations are reviewable at all, a question the Supreme Court 
answered essentially in the negative in Nixon. Gerhardt is scru-
pulously fair in presenting the arguments in favor of justiciability 
and reviewability (they are not the same thing, although they are 
related), but in the end he comes down with the Supreme Court 
and thus against Supreme Court review. Moreover, Gerhardt 
takes essentially the same position regarding review of substance, 
largely agreeing with Judge Stephen Williams (whose opinion in 
the Court of Appeals in Nixon Gerhardt quotes at length (p. 
138)) that if, to use an example of mine and not of Williams or 
Gerhardt, the House were to impeach and the Senate were to 
convict a President or a federal judge for wearing white shoes 
before Memorial Day, then either the weight of public opinion 
would come down against such an action, or if it did not then 
there is nothing the courts could be expected to do about the 
widespread systemic breakdown that could allow such a thing to 
happen. 
If impeachment proceedings are judicially unreviewable, as 
is largely the case as a matter of current law and as Gerhardt 
argues should be the case to an even greater extent, (pp. 118-46, 
171-72) then the role of Congress must be seen differently. 
Under conditions of non-reviewability, Gerhardt argues, the fact 
of non-reviewability makes Congress a constitutional deci-
sionmaker in a particularly strong sense, and Gerhardt's argu-
ment for and endorsement of this consequence is one of the 
important lessons of this book. 
Once Gerhardt arrives at this point, however, he appears to 
lose an opportunity to support this theme in the most effective 
way. For if Gerhardt is correct in believing that we should under-
stand Congress, especially in its impeachment mode, as a consti-
tutional actor in its own right, then one would expect from this 
book much more in the way of the flavor of what Congress actu-
ally does when it is exercising these responsibilities, and what ac-
tually motivates members of Congress in carrying out their 
responsibilities within the process. Yet apart from general de-
scription, and a bit more detail in some of the endnotes, (e.g., pp. 
191, 193, 213, 215) Gerhardt appears far less interested in what 
Congress in fact does than one might expect from the general 
tenor of his argument about Congress as an independent consti-
tutional actor. But if we are interested in congressional behavior 
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vis-a-vis impeachment proceedings, we might be interested in 
knowing whether members of Congress who are lawyers domi-
nate the process, and, if so, in what form; whether members of 
Congress with longer tenure or safer seats behave differently in 
impeachment proceedings from those members whose every 
move and every statement is more likely to be monitored and 
criticized by a political opponent; whether the House behaves 
differently from the Senate, even controlling for the different 
tasks each is assigned in the process; whether members of Con-
gress are more involved personally (as opposed to their staffs) in 
impeachment matters than they are with respect to ordinary leg-
islative tasks; and so on. Gerhardt says that these kinds of ques-
tions are beyond the scope of the book, (pp. x - xii, 137) but that 
seems more of a jurisdictional fiat than a claim that fits comforta-
bly with the theme of the book, even recognizing (pp. xi-xii, 45) 
that some dimensions of the process are conducted out of the 
most obvious forms of public scrutiny. Rather, the extent to 
which the theme of the book stresses congressional responsibility 
cries out for a closer attention to the way in which Congress acts 
in such matters than we find in Gerhardt's book. 
There is an even larger question that surrounds this one, and 
that is the question whether this is an area in which Congress 
takes its constitutional responsibilities seriously, since Congress's 
ability and inclination to do that is the linchpin of Gerhardt's 
normative argument. And on this question, Gerhardt exposes 
the fact that this book's greatest strength-its intelligent, persua-
sive, and careful lawyerly analysis of legal and constitutional ar-
guments, appropriately supported both by the case law and by 
the relevant constitutional history-is closely related to its great-
est weakness. Like the good law professor that he is, Gerhardt 
too often relies on intelligent speculation in areas in which there 
actually is, or, more often, could be developed, harder empirical 
data. Yes, it is reasonable to suppose, as Gerhardt supposes, that 
Congress, unreviewed and unreviewable, might internalize its 
constitutional responsibilities to a substantial degree, just as Par-
liament of the United Kingdom internalizes the non-canonical 
norms that together comprise the British constitution. (pp. 137, 
178) Yet however reasonable this speculation seems, congres-
sional behavior in other areas may inspire less confidence. When 
we examine the hearings and various public statements over the 
years on the question of campaign finance reform, we discover 
that there appears to be no member of Congress who has pub-
licly stated that he believes that campaign finance reform is con-
stitutionally permissible (as against First Amendment 
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objectionss) but inadvisable as a matter of policy, and no mem-
ber of Congress who has publicly stated that she believes that 
campaign finance reform would be wise public policy but is con-
stitutionally impermissible because of the kinds of First Amend-
ment constraints that have been recognized since Buckley v. 
Valeo.6 Every member of Congress who has addressed the issue 
appears to believe either that campaign finance reform is inadvis-
able and unconstitutional, or advisable and not unconstitutional. 
And in the wake of this remarkable coincidence of policy and 
constitutional views, one might wonder whether Congress has 
the capacity to engage in the kind of independent constitutional 
analysis that is at the heart of Gerhardt's prescriptions. 
The inference I draw from an isolated issue might be wrong, 
and I recognize that it is open to question ("tacky" might be a 
better description) whether the appropriate support for my criti-
cism of Gerhardt for being insufficiently sensitive to the empiri-
cal dimension of political and legislative behavior is my own 
largely unsupported speculation. Still, even though I cannot in 
this context test the hypotheses I find reasonable, it remains 
worthwhile, I believe, to underscore the testability and investi-
gatability of the claims about congressional behavior that are 
central to Gerhardt's argument. Moreover, my quarrel is meth-
odologically neutral. Although one might imagine investigating 
congressional behavior through the use of surveys or analyses of 
large data sets, one can imagine doing the same thing in the im-
peachment context by exploring in some detail just how members 
of Congress actually behaved in the small number of recent cases 
that are Gerhardt's focus. 
Such an inquiry might well support the conclusion that im-
peachment is different, and that congressional behavior in im-
peachment cases might be more sensitive to second-order 
constitutional concerns than it is in most other cases. The evi-
dence that Gerhardt does provide appears to support the possi-
bility that Congress, like the courts, behaves at its best when the 
political stakes are at their lowest, as in most modem cases in-
volving impeachment of federal judges for misconduct, or when 
the future of the republic is seen to be at risk, as with the Water-
gate and Richard Nixon impeachment hearings. It is just in the 
middle, perhaps, that the hurly-burly of ordinary politics makes 
constitutional conscientiousness beyond the grasp of so many 
5. See, e.g., Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election 
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policymakers. Yet even this picture might be slightly too optimis-
tic. When we observe the unalloyed and unseemly partisanship 
that has surrounded both Whitewater and the ethics charges 
against Newt Gingrich, the Speaker of the House, there is cause 
to wonder whether congressional ability to deal with charges of 
misconduct in a non-partisan, non-ideological, and non-dema-
gogic manner is getting worse rather than better. And if that is 
the case, then one wonders whether the optimism about congres-
sional ability to rise above raw politics that undergirds 
Gerhardt's arguments for non-reviewability is justified. 
The answer to that question, however, lies neither in my 
speculations nor in Gerhardt's, but in the world of empirical fact, 
a world that is less present in this book than it might have been. 
It is, of course, all too easy to criticize an author for not writing a 
book he did not set out to write, but it is central to my claim here 
that the empirical and political dimensions of actual impeach-
ment proceedings are rendered relevant not by my own interests, 
but by the central line of Gerhardt's own claims. 
That Gerhardt leaves the reader-or at least this reader-
wanting more on the empirical and political side may be testi-
mony to the power and success of Gerhardt's constitutional and 
legal arguments. This book is by some margin the most success-
ful analytic and constitutional analysis of impeachment issues to 
have been written, and it will be the standard work for years to 
come. The substance of Gerhardt's persuasive arguments, how-
ever, demands an inquiry beyond the covers of this volume, and 
while we no longer await the definitive constitutional analysis, we 
still wait for the definitive analysis of congressional behavior in 
impeachment cases, an analysis without which it is impossible to 
evaluate the deeper plausibility of Gerhardt's central arguments. 
